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There is limited literature available in South Africa concerning the interaction of 
doctors with the pharmaceutical industry.  The purpose of this research report 
was to establish what South African doctors believe to be acceptable and 
appropriate incentives from the industry, highlight what they consider reasonable 
compensation for professional activities performed on behalf of the industry; and 
whether they perceive interaction with the industry’s marketing apparatus to be a 
significant influence on their prescribing habits. 
 
Methods 
A questionnaire was emailed to all active doctors in South Africa with email 
addresses from the Medpages® database.  The survey was conducted in March 
2009 - April 2009.  The desired sample size was 500 General Practitioners (GPs) 
and Specialists in private practice. 
 
Results 
A final sample of 400 valid responses was analysed, representing 80% of desired 
sample.  Majority of the respondents were male (74%) with an almost equal split 
between GPs (51.5%) and specialists (48.5%).  The study revealed that 92% of 
the respondents accepted branding items whilst 60% of the respondents 
accepted personal gifts from the industry.  The results revealed that 85% of the 
respondents felt that doctors should be paid for speaking at CMEs, and just over 
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half the sample (52%) felt they wanted to be paid their own rate as opposed to 
the industry rate.  The investigation revealed that 77% of the respondents felt 
that their interaction with the industry influenced their prescribing habits and 
suggesting that such influence to be more pervasive with their colleagues, 
specifically 95% felt their colleagues are influenced by their interaction with 
industry (p< 0.001).  About three quarters of the respondents (73%) believe 
patient management may be compromised if doctors’ prescribing habits are 
influenced by their interaction with the industry.  Most respondents (72.5%) were 
either not aware or did not know of any regulations or guidelines with regards to 
acceptance of gifts by doctors from the industry.   
 
Conclusion 
This study demonstrated that perverse incentives continued to be given to 
doctors, and doctors have not shown a distinct aversion to accepting these 
perverse incentives and gifts.  These perverse interactions have been shown in 
existing literature and in this research report to influence prescribing habits.  
Doctors do not seem to operate within their guidelines and legal framework, as 
stipulated by the HPCSA, when accepting these potentially harmful perquisites.  
What legal and ethical considerations are the doctors employing when accepting 
‘incentives’ from industry is the question; and what is the doctor’s role in 
protecting his/her patients?  Ignorance of the guidelines, as the study indicates to 
be the case, does not justify involvement in perverse relationships.  Doctors have 
professional and personal moral responsibilities to ensure they familiarise 
 vi
themselves with guidelines regulating their professional conduct and ultimately 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
 
The pharmaceutical industry (henceforth ‘the industry’) plays a critical role in the 
development, production, and marketing of new drugs and technologies that are 
essential to the advancement and application of scientific and medical practice.  
Research and development (‘R&D’) of new drugs takes years and costs can run 
into millions of dollars before a product is available to the public.  The incumbent 
pharmaceutical industry, dominated by a handful of listed multinational 
corporations, not only have to recoup development costs on patent drugs and 
technologies, but also achieve their target return on investments.  In many 
instances new drugs are launched at a higher cost than established products 
(Brennan, et al.. 2006: 429; Hemphill 2006: 323-324; Brody 2005: 83; Coyle 
2002: 396; Jureidini and Mansfield 2001: 95).  As a strategic imperative, 
pharmaceutical companies launching new products need to be aggressive in 
market penetration and hasty in gaining market share as the competitive 
advantage conferred by patent protection is of limited duration.  
 
Concerning pharmaceuticals developed for humans, a critical component of the 
industry’s marketing strategy, as Brett, et al.. (2003: 2213) point out, is to acquire 
advocates for their products, increase public awareness through campaigns and 
flood the market with branded items.  Coyle (2002: 397) concedes that all the 
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partnered activities between doctors1 and the industry often offer important 
opportunities to advance medical knowledge and patient care.  Coyle is, 
however, also concerned about the introduction of bias during these activities.  
This is because direct marketing to the end consumer, the patient, is forbidden 
for prescription drugs.  Thus, the leveragability of patient product demand and 
ultimate consumption is achieved through the prescribing doctor.  Due to 
information asymmetry between the doctor and patient, the swaying of doctors’ 
preference towards a specific drug directly influences patients’ choice of drugs 
and is the ultimate driver of sales for the industry competitors.  Previously the 
only restraint on the pharmaceutical multinationals (‘multinationals’) was the size 
of their marketing budget, with the industry spending billions of dollars in 
marketing activities including free drug samples given to prescribing doctors 
(Morgan, et al.. 2006: 559; Coyle 2002:396; Jureidini and Mansfield 2001: 96).  
 
Due to the intensity of industry competition and shrinking margins while 
simultaneously stronger turnover and profit imperatives are demanded, 
marketing practices have been perceived to be increasingly more perverse 
leading most governments to enforce measures aimed at curbing perversity in an 
effort to safeguard patient welfare (Brennan, et al.. 2006: 430; Brett, et al.. 2003: 
2213; Steinman, et al.. 2001: 551). 
 
                                            
1 In the context of the pharmaceutical industry – doctor relationship, in this research report I use 
the terms ‘doctor’ and ‘prescriber’ interchangeably referring to a doctor who prescribes 
pharmaceutical products (drugs) for his or her patients. 
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Numerous studies, including the important contribution by Morgan, et al. (2006), 
have noted the international trend where medical professional bodies and other 
industry stakeholder bodies such as The American College of Physicians, the 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the American Medical 
Association, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, 
International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associations Code, 
and the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry have performed major 
revisions to their guidelines in order to establish more appropriate interactions 
between pharmaceutical companies and prescribing doctors  (Morgan, et al. 
2006: 559; Coyle 2002: 396; Steinman, et al. 2001: 551; Wazana 2000: 379; 
Gibbons, et al. 1998:151).  Locally, South African regulatory interventions have 
included, inter alia, the amendment of the Medicines and Related Substances 
Act 101 of 1965, which rendered the issuing of free drug samples (‘sampling’) to 
prescribing doctors (“prescribers”); and discounts extended to wholesalers and 
retail distributors (“discounting”) illegal (Act 90 of 1997: 5).  This intervention is 
aimed at increasing price transparency, and promoting competition.  The goal is 
thus the attenuation of the drug manufacture’s influence on prescribers. 
 
However, despite regulatory interventions, a perverse relationship between 
prescribers and the pharmaceutical industry has not been totally eradicated.  
Both parties appear not to be sufficiently deterred by regulatory involvement 
including sanctions.  The lure of mutual benefits derived from such a relationship 
appears to be a stronger driver than are regulations which aim to shape and 
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influence ethical behaviour.  As an example, it is conceivable that doctors 
receiving financial inducements fail to speak out against them.  Doctors also 
might fail to object to the “five star” treatment afforded them by a pharmaceutical 
company when sponsored to attend conferences.  Such prescribers might also 
miss the prestige and preferential treatment reserved for being the highest 
prescriber of ‘product  X’, advocate for ‘product Y’, or key opinion leader for 
‘product Z’.  Conversely, the pharmaceutical industry is equally disincentivised to 
report their ’best advocates’, ‘highest prescribers’, etc. to professional bodies.  In 
addition, an incentivised prescriber could conceivably resort to a type of 
blackmail and demand more incentives from a pharmaceutical representative to 
keep their improper business relationship quiet.  The bottom line is that both 
parties involved in such practices run the risk of being implicated and sanctioned 
for unfair inducement or acceptance of perverse incentives.  
 
There exists then, the possibility of a perverse relationship between a prescriber 
and pharmaceutical company.  This potential raises many vexing legal and 
ethical questions. Some examples follow: Who, a doctor or a pharmaceutical 
representative mutually engaged in promoting unnecessary drugs carries the 
greatest ethical breach?  In the case of a doctor requesting a “kick-back” for 
prescribing a particular pharmaceutical product, does the pharmaceutical 
representative have an ethical duty to report this?  Where is the line drawn 
between fair compensation for professional services rendered and perverse 
incentives designed to influence prescribing patterns?  Is it possible for the two 
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parties to engage in a mutually beneficial relationship – one which can be trusted 
to rise above self-interests – and beneficially act in the patient’s best interests?  
Would it be deemed ethical when prescribers start “naming their price” for 
supporting drug A or B when prescribing patterns diverge from clinical indication 
– driven mostly by self-benefit? 
 
Most pharmaceutical companies, at least in South Africa, belong to industry 
associations that have developed guidelines aimed at shaping the relationship 
between the industry and prescribers.  The South African Marketing Code (‘the 
Code’), though still in draft (January 2008), enshrines measures which ensure 
industry accountability and includes guidelines aimed at engendering responsible 
and “ethical” marketing of pharmaceutical products. 
 
It is to be borne in mind that the main thrust and aim of professional guidelines, is 
patently to ensure and protect patient welfare.  The pharmaceutical industry’s 
marketing code purports to espouse the same ideals (SA Marketing Code 2008: 
4).  It is then most instructive to gain insight into the patient’s view of the 
prescribing doctor-pharmaceutical industry incentives dynamic.  Gibbons, et al. 
(1998: 153), conducted a survey amongst patients and doctors, and compared 
their respective attitudes towards industry gifts given to prescribing doctors.  
Patients, it was found, felt gifts were more influential than did their doctors in 




There is substantive literature examining inducements and perverse incentives 
extended to doctors by the industry and the possible ramifications thereof 
(Morgan, et al. 2006: 559; Brody 2005: 82-83; Wazana 2000: 373).  Most of 
these studies aimed to establish that when prescribing doctors were incentivised 
by the pharmaceutical companies, such practices generally were, in the main, 
not in the patient’s best interests.  This is because such doctors were likely to 
prescribe expensive drugs that were not necessarily the most appropriate 
treatment for the patient (Brody 2005: 83; Dana and Loewenstein 2003: 252-253; 
Steinman, et al. 2001: 551).  Such results and many similar-theme investigations 
have been influential in shaping regulation worldwide aimed at curbing unethical 
prescriber behaviour and undesirable marketing practices by pharmaceutical 
companies.  The result of research into this area has been successful creating 
public awareness of the problem.  Worldwide, such responses from both 
medicine and industry have led to the formulation and promulgation of 
regulations to curb such unethical activities.  
  
Wazana (2000: 373) and Dana and Loewenstein (2003: 252-253) contend there 
is general consensus that the prescribing doctor-pharmaceutical company 
relationship is problematic.  In South Africa, the Department of Health (‘DoH’) has 
developed regulatory frameworks to assist industry players in these relationships; 
while the medical professional body, the Health Professionals Council of South 
Africa (HPCSA) has developed guidelines for doctors aimed specifically at 
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managing these interactions.  However, it remains unclear whether such 
interventions have the desired twin effect of influencing ethically desirable doctor 
behaviour and ultimately protecting the patient.   
 
A case cited in the South African Medical Journal (Bateman 2003: 566-567, 
2002: 677-678) concerned a group of referring doctors who were heavily 
sanctioned by the HPCSA for receiving “kickbacks” from a radiology practice for 
their referrals.  It was proven that many of these referrals were unnecessary / not 
clinically indicated but the referral group received inducements based on the 
numbers of patients referred.  This acutely highlights the Council’s resolve to root 
out unethical behaviour in the broader healthcare industry.  While this is different 
from the classical prescribing doctor-pharmaceutical industry relationship, it is 
similar in the placing of greed above ones duties and obligations to patients.  It 
uses patients as a means to an end and not as ends in themselves.  The 
grounding of this ethical directive is found in Kant’s second formulation of the 
Categorical Imperative which bids us to:  
 
Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, 
always as an end and never as a means only (Kant [1785] 1993: 30).  
 
The following scenario is another illustration of what Kant means.  
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Dr X. has an agreement with “Alpha Laboratory”.  This agreement entitles Dr. X. 
to receive a 40% discount each month if she orders more than 100 “special blood 
tests”.  To receive this reduction, Dr. X. consistently and knowingly orders 
superfluous clinically non-indicated laboratory blood tests on her patients in order 
to reach the discount cut-off target.  Dr X uses her patients as a means to her 
end – the price discount – which is for her personal benefit.  Her action is not 
motivated by the desire to achieve an outcome (end) that is optimal for the 
patient from an ethical holistic bio-socio-economic perspective.  Kant’s 
Categorical Imperative remains the maxim that ideally should inform and shape 
the behaviour of both prescribers and the pharmaceutical industry. 
 
Both prescribers and industry have regulations and guidelines supporting ethical 
practises.  Since this is the case, who might be held accountable for ethical 
breaches?  Globally, the thrust of most studies to date has been focused on the 
role of the pharmaceutical companies as the explanatory variable concerning 
perverse prescribing in the doctors-pharmaceutical industry relationship.   
 
This research report intends to question this hypothesis in the South African 
context where admittedly, limited literature is available concerning the interaction 
of doctors with the pharmaceutical industry.  I explore by way of a survey of 
South African doctors in private practice and the extent to which doctors 
themselves desire, and perhaps overtly demand, to be incentivised by the 
pharmaceutical industry.  My exploration will examine the influence of doctors as 
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the explanatory variable on this perverse relationship.  Further, this research 
aims to elucidate what South African doctors believe to be acceptable and 
appropriate incentives from the industry, highlight what they consider reasonable 
compensation for professional activities performed on behalf of the industry; and 
whether they perceive interaction with the industry’s marketing apparatus to be a 
significant influence on their prescribing habits. 
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2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1  Ethical basis of research 
In publicly swearing the Hippocratic Oath or articulating a Medical Declaration 
doctors enter a moral and social contract with society.  Since the practice of 
medicine involves an intimate relationship with other persons, it becomes a moral 
endeavor and as such entails special ethical and moral obligations on the part of 
the doctor not the least of these being the placement of the patient’s best 
interests above all others. Medicine’s social contract with society is expressed in 
the public swearing of an Oath or declaration.   
 
Because of the ways in which the history of medicine and the history of the 
pharmaceutical industry evolved, the same or similar moral obligations that 
doctors are held to were not placed on the pharmaceutical industry and did not 
play a pivotal role in its development.  For example, one does not hear of 
pharmaceutical industry employees being given greater autonomy in exchange 
for service to humanity.  The pharmaceutical industry is accountable ultimately to 
its shareholders. Its raison d’etre is shareholder wealth maximization.  This is not 
to say that the pharmaceutical industry is devoid of any social responsibility.  Yet 
the trajectories of medicine and the pharmaceutical industry are inextricably 
intertwined.  Doctors, on the one hand, have obligations and are accountable to 
society for patient health maximization and welfare; while at the same time they 
rely most heavily on the research and development of new drug products and 
services from the industry.  Doctors are obligated to keep updated in their 
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professional development which entails that they keep abreast of scientific 
developments e.g. new diseases, new ways of treating illnesses, and new clinical 
research findings.  When the paths of industry and medicine engage they also 
seem to carry with them some type of a moral response.  It is most likely that, at 
least arguably, social myths contribute to this: doctors are more moral and 
honest than ordinary citizens as opposed to business people who have no 
qualms whatsoever placing ‘profit over people’.  
 
While it may have been just a historical chain of events which separated the two 
fields as predominately noted in Western Cultures, there is no doubt that doctors 
are held to higher ethical standards than are the ‘common folk’.  
 
Apart from Oaths or declarations, foundational ethical theories such as Virtue 
ethics, Utilitarianism and Kantianism also lend support to the obligation of doctors 
to provide their patients with the best possible care.  
 
Virtue ethics focuses on the character of the agent.  As White (1993:3) puts it: 
“Virtue depends on character, not deeds, and our character is shaped by every 
action we perform”.  Concerning the practice of medicine, its goals and benefits 
are best expressed in relationships where doctors actively exhibit a 
professionalism that includes the virtues of e.g. honesty and integrity, respect for 
patients, compassion, and the dedication to their field expressed through keeping 
up to date through continuing professional development (Jonsen, Siegler and 
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Winslade 2002:14-15).  Of course, the idea of developing a good character does 
not apply only to one profession or one individual.  In addition to those virtues 
already mentioned, others such as courage, good faith, and loyalty are also 
important factors in individual morality.  Virtue ethics, as Aristotle explains is 
important because its focus is placed on the development of good character 
through practicing the virtues (Nicomachean Ethics, Book X, section 9).  In this 
way of thinking, when each of us as individuals make a decision to do or not to 
do something we are obliged to consider if our choice (e.g. the choice between 
being honest or dishonest) was the virtuous choice.  Our goal should be to 
develop the virtue of being an honest person as a foundational part of our 
character.   
 
Although Virtue ethics is not unique to the practice of medicine, it has played a 
major role in the shaping of society’s perception concerning ideas of what 
constitutes a “good” doctor/health care professional.  This perception points to 
one of a person of trust who is honest, compassionate, knowledgeable, sensitive, 
and who importantly, places the other’s best interests above his or her own.  
 
An ethical system which upholds the doctor’s duty to individual patients and 
society is that of Utilitarianism.  Founded by Jeremy Bentham (then later 
reworked by James Mill and John Stuart Mill), Utilitarianism has as its first 
principle that of utility.  This first principle is commonly stated as: “Act to promote 
the greatest amount of happiness/ good / pleasure for the greatest number of 
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people” (Frey 2000:165).  This way of thinking links the ethical character of 
actions or policies (right or wrong / good or bad) to their overall consequences.  
In the context of prescribing doctors and the pharmaceutical industry, the 
Principle of Utility would consider that it is a right action for a doctor to prescribe 
only the necessary amount, clinically appropriate, and fiscally affordable drug 
relative to a patient’s illness.  If all doctors acted accordingly, then there would be 
a greater chance of benefit to all patients.  
 
In this context, health economists in South Africa and globally, have identified the 
cost of scripted premium priced patented pharmaceutical drugs as one of the 
major drivers of health care costs.  Clinically unsupported, prescribing of 
expensive drugs manifestly contributes to the increase in health care costs 
(Hemphill 2006: 323-325; Dana and Loewenstein 2003: 252-253; van den 
Heever 2002-2003: 7, Jureidini and Mansfield 2001: 95).  The resultant health 
care inflation, which in most developed economies and in South Africa – an 
emerging economy –  has outstripped the general Consumer Price Index (‘CPI’) 
has meant decreasing access to health for the majority, even those fortunate to 
have some form of health insurance.  The fact of perversely incentivised 
prescribing habits cannot be viewed as promoting the greatest happiness/ good / 
pleasure for the greatest number of people.  On the other hand, increased 
scripting clearly translates to higher earnings for the pharmaceutical companies, 
here the benefit is clear.  But neither perverse action, be it from a doctor or the 
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pharmaceutical industry fulfil the requirement to benefit the greatest number of 
people.   
 
The final ethical system addressed in this research report is Kantian ethics.  
Kantian ethics is based on the premise that moral actions are not driven by 
developing good character or our desires or a good outcome.  Rather, moral 
action is driven by an agent’s motive - his or her moral intent.  For Kant, the only 
thing good is a good will, that is, one follows reason’s guidance and acts from a 
sense of duty (Kant 1993:5).  For an action to be good, Kant believed that it must 
not simply be conducted because of a moral law (follow a moral rule) but must be 
performed for the sake of moral law.  In other words, a person does good not 
because he or she is inclined to do good as in Virtue ethics, or because the good 
action would have positive consequences as in Utilitarianism.  For Kantians, 
actions classified as good, must be inherently good regardless of the ends, goals 
or objectives we might have.  To quote Hill (2000: 228):  
 
It is a familiar Kantian theme that they act on principle, where the governing 
maxim is not on the form “I will do X because as it happens X promotes Y, which 
I want” but rather “I will do X, regardless of its effect on what I desire.  
 
Placing this in context, let us see how the application of one’s motive / intent 
might play out in practice:  When a doctor has been identified as Company X’s 
highest prescriber or Company advocate for a product, what might his/her motive 
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be in prescribing or leveraging his/her status and influence in the medical 
community when advocating to colleagues a given product?  Can we say for 
certain that the doctor’s motive or intent is shaped by Kantian ethics (true belief 
in the good a particular product brings to his patients)?  Or might it be driven by 
the lure of perquisites (“perks”) and incentives offered to him by the drug 
manufacturer? 
 
Linking these three major ethical systems, we can see some central elements 
that can be used in shaping the ethical character of an action.  One way of 
thinking looks at the character of the agent, one looks at the results of the action 
and the latter looks at the actions themselves.  Between all can be seen a wide 
range of internal and external factors of human actions that have ethical 
consequences.  Although these systems of ethics differ and conflict in theory, in 
practice they can be said to compliment each other.  This is evident in the 
questions Hill (ibid: 228) addresses:  
 
Will the doctor prescribe the premium priced drug X because as it happens doing 
so will place him in a good position to qualify for an overseas trip the 
manufactures of drug X are sponsoring, a holiday the doctor wants or will the 
doctor prescribe the most cost effective and clinically appropriate drug regardless 
of the effect such prescribing action will have on his prospects to qualify for the 
overseas trip; which he desires.  If the former course is adopted, what do such 
 16
actions reveal about the doctor’s primary responsibility to the patient’s health and 
general welfare? 
 
Having given direction concerning three ethical systems, the question as to how 
doctors should fashion their behaviour in a doctor-pharmaceutical industry 
relationship, is addressed in Coyle (2002: 397).  
 
Coyle examines the doctor’s ethical position concerning gifts and financial 
relationships with the industry and proposes positions which are posited to assist 
doctors in making ethical decisions when interacting with the industry.  She 
highlights that these positions are based on the medical profession’s 
fundamental principles of Biomedical ethics (see: Beauchamp and Childress’ 
Principles of Biomedical Ethics 1997).  For Coyle, these include the duty of 
responsibility; the obligation to act in the patient’s best interest (beneficence), the 
obligation to protect the patient from harm (non-maleficence), and the duty to 
respect the patient while fostering the process of informed choice (autonomy).   
 
Coyle points out that it is a general feeling that most doctors do not regard 
promoting equity in health care as their responsibility.  However, she poignantly 
argues to the contrary by contending that doctors should bear the responsibility 
of promoting equity in health care delivery (justice).  
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Deriving from ethical theories and principles, another critical ethical consideration 
concerns the professional duties doctors owe their patients.  The Royal College 
of Physicians (RCP 2005) states:  
 
At the heart of good medical care is a set of values, attitudes, and behaviour 
called medical professionalism.  
 
Medical professionalism is a set of virtues, values, and behaviour that underpins 
the trust the public has in doctors, and the medical profession is distinguished by 
the need for judgment in the face of uncertainty (RCP 2005: 1; Coyle 2002: 396-
397).  In 1999, the RCP began The Medical Professionalism Project (RCP 2005). 
It consists in a Charter which set out three principles which doctors should 
always follow: patients’ welfare, patients’ autonomy, and social justice.  The 
Charter also set out professional responsibilities which were expressed as ten 
professional commitments: competence, honesty confidentiality, maintaining 
appropriate relationships, improving quality of care, improving access to care, the 
just distribution of finite resources, scientific knowledge, maintaining trust and 
professional duties (RCP 2005: 6).  
 
Concerning medical professionalism, in “Educating for Professionalism in 
Medicine,” a position statement by the Association of American Medical Colleges 
(AAMC), a few definitions of professionalism is given.  
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The AAMC defines professionalism as altruistic which encompasses respect, 
compassion, ethical probity, honesty, and avoidance of conflicts of interest (Inui 
2003: 12).  Further, in the USA the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical 
Education (ACGME) professionalism includes such virtues and values as 
respect: compassion, integrity, responsiveness to needs, altruism, accountability, 
commitment to excellence, sound ethics and sensitivity to culture, age, gender, 
disabilities (ibid).  It is also noteworthy that doctors should evince core humanistic 
virtues and values (e.g. honesty, integrity, caring, compassion, altruism, 
empathy, respect for others and trustworthiness) and adhere to high ethical and 
moral standards (ibid). 
A statement from this Council (ibid: 11) is particularly relevant:  
  
In the end, it is not because we have special knowledge and technology that we 
can be trusted – instead, we are trusted only if this knowledge and technology is 
firmly attached to values that are explicit, understood, and (when push comes to 
shove) altruistic.   
 
Locally, The Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA) has formulated 
guidelines to help doctors achieve the onerous task of delivering what is best for 
the patient.  The HPCSA’s ethical and professional guidelines clearly state:  
 
A practitioner shall not engage in or advocate the preferential use or prescription 
of any medicine, if any improper financial gain or valuable consideration is 
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derived from such preferential use or prescription or the advocacy of preferential 
usage by the doctor (HPCSA Booklet 2 2007: 18; HPCSA Booklet 7 2007:6). 
 
The HPCSA guidelines on over-servicing, perverse incentives, and related 
matters (HPCSA Booklet 7 2007: 1) regard it as an offence to offer or accept a 
perverse incentive.  The notion of the profession’s autonomy is re-enforced by 
the HPCSA noting that: Health care is to a large extent self-governing and 
practitioners must ensure that their participation in Continuing Professional 
Development (‘CPD’) activities is in keeping with their duties towards patients 
and society (ibid: 10).  
 
The HPCSA guidelines serve to assist the doctor when there is potential conflict 
of interest and further require that doctors should always maintain autonomy, 
independence and regard the clinical needs of their patients as paramount (ibid: 
1).  
 
Yet questions remain: Is it possible for doctors to remain honest and altruistic 
under significant material influence and inducement from the pharmaceutical 
industry despite the strict regulatory framework, explicit professional ethical 
guidelines, and the publicly pronounced pharmaceutical industry self-regulating 
marketing code?  Does it perhaps not confound reason to expect parties in a 
symbiotic relationship, as exists in the perceived perverse doctor-pharmaceutical 
company relationship, to exercise impartial and objective oversight roles over 
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each other’s behaviour and practices when this very act fundamentally threatens 
the symbiosis? 
 
To quote Coyle (2002: 397) “while the ethics of medicine and the ethics of the 
business sometimes diverge, both are legitimate, and a thoughtful collaboration 
between physicians and industry can result in the best of patient care”.  Brody 
(2005: 83) feels that one of the doctor’s ethical duties, other than serving the 
patient’s interest, is clinical competence.  He accepts that this will include 
accepting well-grounded medical evidence from the industry.  There seems to be 
a consensus that the interaction between industry and the medical profession is 
necessary and ideally, both should be engaged to ensure that the good of the 
patient trumps all other wishes, dreams, and desires.  To do otherwise stands in 
sharp contravention of the ethical systems, principles, guidelines, rules, Oaths 
and declarations which have and continue to ground the practice of medicine as 
a moral enterprise.  
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2.2  Legal basis of research 
2.2.1  South African legal and regulatory framework 
 
The Medicines and Related Substances Control Act 101 of 1965, as amended 
Act 90 of 1997 (henceforth the ‘Act’) is the cornerstone of the regulatory legal 
framework for pharmaceutical governance in South Africa.  The aims of the Act 
were principally to lower the cost of pharmaceutical products and improve price 
transparency.  
 
Section 18A aspires to achieve the fundamental aims of the Act  by, inter alia,  
minimizing perverse incentives given by the pharmaceutical companies to 
prescribers, encouraging generic medicines usage, and illegalising bulk 
discounts offered to pharmaceutical wholesalers and distributors (Act 90 of 1997: 
5).  The regulator’s concern was that doctors were likely to prescribe and 
dispense (dispensing doctors) drugs that were discounted or prescribe drugs 
where they were likely to receive rebates.   
 
The “prescribe & dispense” problem is an Apartheid legacy problem where, in the 
impoverished Black townships, there were no pharmacies and it was the practice 
for a general practitioner to keep an inventory of drugs for his or her patients.  
Therefore, most general practitioners, especially in the townships were also 
dispensing doctors.  This meant they operated and owned the dispensary of the 
drugs they in turn prescribed.  These dispensing doctors evidently had a profit 
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incentive from the pharmaceutical retail margin, over and above the classical 
prescribing doctor- pharmaceutical company relationship dynamic; which has 
been shown to be perverse (van den Heever 2002-2003 :18-21).  The patient did 
not benefit from the discounted price as the discount was not passed onto the 
patient.  In addition, because of the discount or bonus incentive, patients were to 
receive inappropriate drug treatment because of inventory management 
challenges e.g. where the doctor may have high stock levels of a given drug, but 
not the appropriate one. 
 
Section 18B of the Act renders sampling of any medicine illegal (Act 90 of 1997: 
5).  In this situation, doctors would dispense and sometimes charge patients for 
samples of innovative products, which in most instances was not sustainable as 
the patient’s financial position could not fund these more expensive drugs or 
medical funders refused to reimburse because there were cheaper existing 
alternatives.  Once the samples ran out, patients had to revert to whatever 
medication they could afford or what the medical funder could reimburse.  This 
type of situation was not optimal for patient management especially for chronic 
conditions like hypertension, diabetes, etc.  To compound the problem and 
further compromise the patient’s financial position, in some instances patients 
were billed by their doctors for these ‘free samples’.  Such samples were not for 
retail use but given to doctors by pharmaceutical companies as part of their 
market penetration strategies.   
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Section 18C of the Act recommended the need for a Code of Ethics for the 
pharmaceutical industry.  This Code has been developed by the industry and is 
currently being reviewed by government (Act 90 of 1997: 6). 
Here it is worth reiterating that the spirit of all measures outlined above strive to 
curb perverse marketing activities by the pharmaceutical industry; and ultimately 
improve patient welfare. 
 
2.2.2  Industry Self Regulation 
The South African Code of Practice for the Marketing of Medicines (SA Marketing 
Code) 
 
The SA Marketing Code was finalised in January 2008 by the industry and is 
currently being reviewed by the Department of Health (DoH).  The majority of 
pharmaceutical companies participated and contributed in the compilation of the 
Code.  These companies have in principle agreed to subscribe to the Code on 
the principle of self-regulation (SA Marketing Code 2008: 4).  
 
The Code aims to promote ethical marketing of medicines by the industry and 
also signifies the industry’s commitment to ethical and professional marketing 
activities by all stakeholders including prescribers and advisers.  The industry, 
through the Code, also seeks to demonstrate its desire to preserve the 
independence of the doctors (ibid: 4).  The strength of the Code is that it will be 
enforced through the acceptance of  accountability by all stakeholders.  Moreover 
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and importantly, it will be  enforceable through a formal process handling 
complaints.  A Marketing Code Authority (MCA) will be established to deal with 
complaints from the industry stakeholders.  Through this authority, an appeal or 
complaints body will be established to enforce corrective measures on parties 
that err (ibid: 32-43). 
 
Section 18 of the Code addresses inducements, gifts, and promotional items 
stating:  
 
…There shall be no personal enrichment of healthcare professionals or other 
healthcare providers.  No gift, benefit in kind, rebate, discount, kickback or any 
other pecuniary advantage shall be offered or given to members of the health 
profession, administrative staff, government officials, or the general public as an 
inducement to prescribe, supply, stock, dispense, administer or buy any 
medicine, subject to the provisions of Clause 18.2 (ibid: 21).  
Occasional gifts and promotional items would be of minimal value which will be 
determined by the MCA from time to time.  Gifts for personal use would not be 
allowed except where it is a cultural courtesy gift.  A maximum of one 
inexpensive gift per year may be given to a healthcare professional (ibid: 22).   
 
The concern with the flexibility of the Code is the likelihood that some 
pharmaceutical companies would still try to find loopholes and gaps in this 
regulation.  It poses a challenge to the rest of the industry to monitor these 
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activities.  An additional concern is the lack of measures to record and audit 
frequency and monetary value of these gifts.  Despite these obstacles, efforts by 
government and industry (The Medicines and Related Substances Control Act 
101 of 1965, as amended Act 90 of 1997 and the South African Code of Practice 
for the Marketing of Medicines) are apparent in the hope to curb illegal and 
unethical practices by prescribers and industry. 
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2.2.3  International Law and Marketing Codes 
 
Globally, substantial research has been carried out by various regulatory 
authorities and industry bodies to facilitate optimal working relations between the 
pharmaceutical industry and doctors.  This is based on the shared position that 
the final outcome must be ensure the best interest of the patient and to always 
aim to improve the patient’s overall welfare. 
 
United States of America (USA) 
In the USA, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America 
(PhRMA), code (revised in 2008) aims to encourage industry relationships with 
healthcare professionals that are not perceived as inappropriate by patients nor 
the public at large.  The PhRMA code emphasises focusing on patients’ medical 
needs and doctors’ medical knowledge and experience.  Company or industry 
interaction with doctors is perceived as professional in nature and fashioned to 
facilitate the exchange of medical or scientific information that will benefit patient 
care.   
 
Perquisites are not outright forbidden, but guidelines on what is deemed 
appropriate advise, for instance, that hospitality and entertainment should be 
modest and occur in a manner conducive to providing scientific value (PhRMA 
2008: 2-5).  Items of minimal value that are relevant to the professional’s practice 
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are allowed provided the quantity and frequency does not suggest inducement 
(ibid: 12). 
  
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) which licenses drugs in the USA, also 
plays an important role in monitoring the pharmaceuticals industry activities post 
licensing.  These ’include guidelines on the use of promotional material and the 
qualifications of the industry speakers.  Promotional material should be 
consistent with the FDA requirements governing such communications and 
speakers for the industry are required to be well trained.  This is because the 
FDA holds companies accountable for the presentations of their speakers (ibid: 
9-10). 
 
The PhRMA code is not so rigorous as to expect doctors to render speaking 
services for pharmaceuticals companies, using their professional knowledge and 
time, for free.  The code states that doctors acting as speakers on behalf of 
industry can be reasonably compensated, fair market value, for their time 
provided speaking arrangements are not inducements or rewards for prescribing 
products for the company (ibid). 
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United Kingdom (UK) 
In the UK, Part IV (section 21) of the Medicines Advertising Regulations of 1994 
which governs the advertising of registered medicines states that ‘where relevant 
medicinal products are being promoted to persons qualified to prescribe or 
supply relevant medicinal products, no person shall supply, offer or promise to 
such persons any gift, pecuniary advantage or benefit in kind, unless it is 
inexpensive and relevant to the practice of medicine or pharmacy’. 
 
The Association of British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI) Code of Practice 
which represents the UK industry, is backed by statutory control, and aims to 
ensure ethical and professional promotional activities by the industry.  The 
industry is committed to benefiting patients and wants to ensure appropriate use 
of medicines.  The ABPI Code amongst other things addresses potential conflict 
for doctors with regards to provision of gifts and hospitality by the industry (ABPI 
2006: 4-5). 
The Code of Practice discourages gifts that are given as an inducement to 
prescribe, recommend or sell any medicine’ but allows promotional aids of low 
value.  Medical and educational goods for the benefit of patients are also 
acceptable under this Code  they are branded with the corporate and not the 
product name (ibid: 27). 
 
The Code continues to point out that where doctors act as service providers for 
the industry, their remuneration must not be linked to sales in any particular 
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territory or sales of a specific product (ibid: 29).  This is to ensure that the 
doctors’ motives for prescribing a given drug are not tied to the drug company’s 
sales’ (and ultimately earnings) maximization imperative.  Complaints and 
transgressions to the ABPI code are handled by the Prescription Medicines Code 
of Practice Authority (ibid: 36-49). 
 
The General Medical Council (GMC) is the regulatory body for the medical 
profession in the UK and is responsible for giving guidance on standards of 
professional conduct and medical ethics’ (ibid: 31).   
 
Paragraph 1 of the GMC Good Medical Practice (2006) captures the essence of 
a good doctor as: 
 
Doctors that make the care of their patients their first concern: they are 
competent, keep their knowledge and skills up to date, establish and maintain 
good relationships with patients and colleagues, are honest and trustworthy, and 
act with integrity.  
 
Paragraph 74 (GMC 2006) encourages doctors to act in their patients’ best 
interests.  The acceptance or request for gifts or inducements is highly 
discouraged especially where such inducements can be seen to affect the 




Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies (Rx&D) represents the 
pharmaceutical industry in Canada.  Rx&D is a member of the International 
Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associates (IFPMA) and 
strongly supports the missions and principles of the IFPMA code. Rx&D 
embraces the ideals of a fair and free society that include, amongst others, the 
freedom to trade and carry on commerce, and the freedom to allow science and 
medicine to advance their knowledge bases.  The Canadian Code accepts the 
obligation to ensure that Canadian doctors and patients have access to 
education and information about the appropriate use of the industry products and 
services.  That obligation includes using non-coercive and non-inducing means 
and methods of communication (Rx&D Code of Conduct 2006: 3).  
 
The guiding principles include: modest meals and refreshments as the only 
acceptable form of hospitality, no monetary or other consideration is to be given 
to doctors for the purpose of gaining access or influence and grants or donations 
are never to be provided to doctors to promote specific prescription medicines 
(ibid: 4).  Concerning “incentives” the Code (ibid: 9) states:  
 
Industry must not offer to any health care professional or to any member of a 
health care professional’s clinical or administrative staff, any gift – in cash or 
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kind, or any promotional aid, prize or reward or any other item which is intended 
for personal or family benefit or pecuniary advantage. 
 
Any breach of the Code of Conduct by stakeholders is handled through the 
Industry Practices Review Committee (‘IPRC’) (ibid: 12-14). 
 
International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associates 
(IFPMA) 
The IFPMA is a non-profit, non-governmental organisation representing industry 
associations and companies from both developed and developing countries 
(IFPMA Code 2006: 3).  The IFPMA encourages participation from companies 
and industry associations whether local codes exist or not in the various member 
countries.  Where there are no local codes or applicable laws the IFPMA code 
can be used as a default code to govern marketing activities by the industry (ibid: 
2).  
 
This Code re-emphasises industry’s commitment to educational and promotional 
activities that benefit patients and promotional programs and collaborations that 
enhance the practice of medicine.  It seeks to be the overarching body that 
oversees promotional practices worldwide, especially in countries where there 
are no local regulations or codes (ibid: 1).  Consistent with the various country 
national codes, the IFPMA Code encourages reasonable reimbursement to 
doctors who provide genuine services as speakers or presenters and considers 
 32
practice related gifts of minimal value to be appropriate for health care 
professionals (ibid: 12-13).  
 
Concerning accountability, complaints relating to the infringement of the IFPMA 
Code can be sent to the IFPMA secretariat.  The IFPMA, in an attempt to resolve 
the complaint, will communicate with senior management of the company in 
breach of the Code (ibid: 15-22).  Following procedure, the company or industry 
found in breach will be subject to strict penalties.   
 
The local industry has instituted a Marketing Code which it purports to honour 
and agrees to abide by all applicable regulations.  Yet, because the practice of 
doctors is asking for, expecting and in some instances, demanding inducements 
from the pharmaceutical companies is quite embedded in South African medical 
practice, it is questionable if these measures in themselves are sufficient and of 
such force and effect as to influence the prescribing doctor’s behaviour.  
 
All professionals should be compensated with fair market value for rendering 
professional service.  Concerning that, there is agreement.  However, questions 
remain e. g. What  “fair price” and importantly, at what point might a patient’s 
care and wellbeing likely be compromised when greed enters into the doctor-
pharmaceutical industry relationship? 
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3.0  EMPIRICAL ARM OF THE REPORT 
3.1  Research Objectives and Methods 
3.1.1  Overall aims of the report 
 
Industry relationships with doctors should aim to support, and be consistent with 
the professional responsibilities the doctors have towards their patients.  The 
Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA) guidelines outline clearly 
what the doctor’s obligations are and how doctors should conduct themselves 
when interacting with the pharmaceutical industry.  However, it remains 
debatable as to whether these guidelines have the desired effect on the 
profession. 
 
The aim of this paper was to seek to understand what the respondent doctors 
feel is appropriate behaviour when interacting with the pharmaceutical industry.  
The local Marketing Code needs to encourage transparency on gifts given and 
payments made to healthcare professionals by the industry.  An open register, 
which is already encouraged in the USA (Ross, et al.. 2007: 1216-1217), which 
can be audited randomly will remove barriers and difficulties in reporting perverse 
incentives by the industry or the healthcare professionals themselves.  
Healthcare professionals who bill appropriately for their services should not be 
embarrassed to have these figures open to public scrutiny.  These efforts in no 
way aim to undermine the pivotal role the pharmaceutical industry plays in the 
healthcare value chain.  The existence of the pharmaceutical industry is critical 
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for the advancement of medical knowledge and development of new 
technologies.  However, the industry and the healthcare profession need to 
coexist in an environment that fosters educational value and advancement of 
medical knowledge to the benefit of the end user, the patient. 
 
3.1.2  Study objectives 
 
The overall objective of the study is to establish doctors’ opinions on gifts and 
incentives offered by the pharmaceutical industry. 
The primary objective was to establish 
1. The prescribing doctors’ opinion on the acceptance of incentives, gifts and 
inducements offered by the pharmaceutical industry. 
The secondary objectives were to establish 
1. The prescribing doctors’ opinion of the influence their interaction with the 
pharmaceutical industry upon their prescribing habits. 
2. The prescribing doctors’ opinion about compensation for speaking 
engagements on behalf of the pharmaceutical industry. 
3. The prescribing doctors’ awareness of the regulatory guidelines governing 
their acceptance of gifts and incentives from the pharmaceutical industry. 
 
The specific questions to address the secondary objectives aimed to 
• Establish if doctors felt it was appropriate to accept branding items from 
the pharmaceutical industry. 
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• Establish if doctors felt it was appropriate to engage in frequent 
relationship dinners with the pharmaceutical industry. 
• Establish if doctors felt it was appropriate for them to be sponsored by 
pharmaceutical companies to congresses regularly. 
• Establish if doctors felt it was appropriate to accept personal gifts from the 
pharmaceutical industry. 
• Establish what the doctors felt was appropriate compensation for 
presenting to CME gatherings, medical aid funders and medical 
congresses on behalf of pharmaceutical companies. 
• Establish if doctors felt the interaction with the pharmaceutical industry 
influences their prescribing habits. 
 
3.1.3  Methods 
A questionnaire (Appendix A) based on previous work done by Morgan et al. 
2006: 560; Brett et al. 2003: 2214; Steinman et al. 2001: 552 and Gibbons et al. 
1998: 152 was developed.  The questionnaire was hosted by an independent 
internet company, Afridesign that specialises in setting up web-based surveys.  
The data was collated in an anonymous manner, the system does not store any 
personally identifiable information.  The questionnaire was emailed as a web-link 
to the participants.  Responses were kept electronically on the website and 
downloaded at the end of the survey.  
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The questionnaire collected the following demographics: gender, age, type of 
practice and the province where the doctor is based.  Specifically, the 
demographic profiling was colour blind. 
 
The majority of the questionnaire was quantitative as respondent doctors were 
required to rate their responses on a 4 point Likert scale.  A minor qualitative 
component was introduced by the inclusion of a few open ended questions; 
making up only 10% of the questionnaire.  The survey was conducted from 
March 2009 to April 2009.  Weekly reminder emails were sent to all participants.  
The questionnaire was internet-based making it difficult to decipher who the 
respondents were and hence reminder emails were sent to everyone.  The 
database was locked on the 20th of April 2009. 
 
3.2  Study Population and sampling 
Study population was general practitioners (GPs) and specialists in private 
practice in South Africa.  Sample included all doctors with email addresses, 
approximately 14 000, across all provinces as per Medpages® database.  The 
database was filtered to include all active medical practitioners, using Medical 
Practitioner (MP) numbers, with email addresses.  Active medical practitioners 
were practitioners who had not retired or deceased.  The filtration process 
however inevitably led to the inclusion of respondent doctors in the public sector 
as the private-public data stratification was not discernable from the email 
addresses.  In mitigation of this implicit sampling contamination an additional 
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criterion to indicate whether the doctor is in the private or the public sector was 
included in the questionnaire.  The results were filtered to include only doctors in 
the private sector.  The desired sample size was 500 doctors; comprising both  
general practitioners and specialists in private practice.   
 
3.3  Ethical Issues 
The researcher has received Research Ethics Committee (REC) (Human) 
approval from the University of the Witwatersrand to conduct this research with 
general practitioners and specialists in private practice across South Africa.  The 
Committee’s research approval number is M080602 (Appendix B). 
 
3.3.1  Confidentiality 
The webpage with the questionnaire was hosted by an independent internet 
company.  All identifiers like names or MP number were removed, and only email 
addresses were captured in the final sample database.  The researcher was not 
be able to link participants and their responses to the questionnaire.  
 
3.3.2  Informed Consent 
The survey did not involve use of patient records or any form of human tissue 
samples, for instance blood or urine samples from patients.  A participant 
information sheet was included to explain the objectives of the survey (Appendix 
C).  The completion of the questionnaire by the doctor was deemed to imply 
consent to participation.  
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3.4  Data management 
Data was obtained from the internet company as coded data which was analysed 
by the researcher, with the help of a statistician. Data security will be ensured as 
all research data will be kept under lock and key for a period of 5 years, after 
which period it will be destroyed. 
 
3.5  Statistical analysis 
The data was analysed using the following methods (Appendix D): 
• Cronbach’s alpha to measure internal consistency of the questionnaire. 
• Frequency distribution of individual questions 
• Cross tabulation between questions 
• Cross tabulation between items and demographics 
 
3.6  Study limitations and bias 
The survey was limited to doctors with active email and internet access.  The 
study was also subject to non-response bias.  It has been noted that the typical 
response rate in surveys ranges from 35% to 60% (Morgan et al.. 2005: 560).  
Prescription bias has also been documented by Dana and Loewenstein (2003: 
254) as doctors do not perceive themselves to be influenced by industry, but feel 
their counterparts are likely to be influenced by industry activities. 
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4.0.  RESULTS 
 
The database was locked on the 20th of April 2009, at which point 496 valid 
responses had been received.  Ninety six (96) of the responses from the total 
response pool were from the public sector and hence were excluded from the 
analysis as they fell outside the sample definition.  Therefore, a final sample of 
400 valid respondents, comprising of both general practitioners (GPs) and 
specialists in the private sector were analysed.  This represented 80% of the 
intended sample.  
The study questionnaire demonstrated very good internal consistency as 
measured by the Cronbach alpha statistical measure.  Specifically, the results 
yielded a Cronbach alpha of 0.820 (82%), which is comfortably above the 
required hurdle of 0.70 (70%). 
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4.1 Demographics  
4.1(a) Demographics of responding doctors (see Table 1) 
 
Results revealed a gender bias, with a majority (74.25%)  male response rate.  
The distribution in terms of medical speciality revealed an almost equal split 
between GPs (51.5%) and specialists (48.5%).  The mode and median age 
group was the 41 -50 years olds (34%); and together with the 31-40 years 
(31.25%) and 51-60 years (23.50%) groups comprised the majority of the 
respondents.  Respondents <30 years accounted for 2.75% of the sample and 
respondents >61 years of age were 8.5% of the sample.   
Geographically, the highest percentage of responses were from Gauteng (45%) 
followed by the Western Cape (21%) and KwaZulu Natal (14%) provinces 
respectively.  Responses received from other provinces were as follows Eastern 
Cape (7%), Free State (4%), North West (3%), Limpopo (3%), Mpumalanga (2%) 
and Northen Cape (1%) 
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<30 years 11 2.75
31-40 years 125 31.25
41-50 years 136 34
51-60 years 94 23.5






4.1 (b)  Frequency of visits from industry representatives (see Figure 1) 
A very high proportion of the sample (87.3%) saw a representative a minimum of 
once a month.  About two thirds of the respondents (64.3%) see pharmaceutical 
sales representatives either once a week or more than once a week, while just 
under a quarter (23%) saw representatives less frequently, either once a month 
or twice a month. 
 
Figure 1.  Frequency of Doctors seeing Pharmaceutical Sales Reps 
































4.2  Establishing doctors’ opinions on gifts and incentives offered by the 
pharmaceutical industry 
 
A 4 point Lickert scale was used to give participants varying options to express 
how they felt under the different interaction scenarios proposed in the 
questionnaire.  To facilitate   analysis and reporting, the responses have been 
grouped as follows; responses for ‘Never’ have been coded as ‘No,’ and ‘Always, 
Often and Sometimes’  as ‘Yes respectively’. 
Further, responses for ‘Agree and Strongly Agree’ have been captured as ‘Agree’ 
and responses for Disagree and Strongly Disagree’ grouped as ‘Disagree’. 
Responses for ‘Inappropriate and Somewhat Inappropriate’ have been captured 
as ‘Inappropriate’, and those for ‘Appropriate and Somewhat Appropriate’ have 
been captured as ‘Appropriate’. 
Finally, responses for ‘Proper and Very Proper’ were captured as ‘Proper’, 
whereas ‘Improper and Very Improper’ have been captured as ‘Improper’. 
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4.2(a)  Acceptance of branding items from industry (see Figure 2) 
 
An overwhelming majority (92%) of the respondents accepted branding items 
from the industry and almost the entire sample (99% of the respondents) was of 
the opinion their colleagues were behaving likewise and accepted branding items 
from the industry.   
 
Figure 2.  Percentage of respondents that accept branding items from industry: 
Self vs. Colleagues 

















A statistically significant 85% of respondents who did not accept branding items 
felt their colleagues, exhibited behaviour to the contrary, and actually did 
(p<0.001). 
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4.2(b)  Acceptance of invitations to relationship dinners with industry (see Figure 
3) 
 
Whereas about three quarters (74%) of the respondents accepted invitations to 
relationship dinners with the industry, 23% more thought their colleagues 
accepted invitations to relationship dinners with industry.  
 
Figure 3.  Percentage of respondents that accept invitations to relationship 
dinners with industry: Self vs. Colleagues. 

















Again, the proportion of respondents who claimed not to accept invitations to 
relationship dinners, but felt their colleagues did was high (87.5%) and 
statistically significant with p<0.001. 
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4.2(c)  Acceptance of sponsorship to congresses (see Figure 4) 
 
Although just under half the sample (45%) claimed to accept regular sponsorship 
to congresses from the same company, more than twice this number (93%) 
thought their colleagues accepted regular sponsorship to congresses from the 
same company. 
 
Figure 4.  Percentage of respondents that accept regular sponsorship to 
congresses from the same company: Self vs. Colleagues 





















A third (33.5%) of GPs versus 58% of specialists accepted regular sponsorship 
to congresses from the same company (p<0.001); while 88% of respondents who 
did not accept regular sponsorship to congresses from the same company felt 
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their colleagues did (p<0.001).  Both these findings were found to be statistically 
significant as demonstrated by the level of significance indicated above. 
 
The study revealed that 60% of the respondents accepted personal gifts from the 
industry.  Further, on a 4 point Lickert scale the respondents were asked to 
indicate if they found it ethical to receive certain perquisites from pharmaceutical 
companies and most (75%) found it inappropriate to accept a personal gift to the 
value of R1, 000.   
Also, in descending order of deemed appropriateness  the respondents felt it was 
proper to accept branding items (85%), tickets to sporting events (60%) and spa 
vouchers (57%), while only 16% indicated it was proper to accept a free weekend 
away with a spouse as a reward or inducement. 
 
4.2(d) Interpretation of ‘gift’ by the respondents 
 
The respondents were probed via an open-ended question to give their 
interpretation of what they perceived to be a gift from a pharmaceutical company.  
After collating and coding the questionnaire responses in the following categories 
emerged:  
• 25% of the respondents felt branding items like pens and mugs, were 
gifts. 
•  25% felt personal items like vouchers, perfumes or any items not relevant 
to the practice were gifts. 
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• 17% felt any item of high value i.e. >R200 whether personal or related to 
practice were gifts.  For example, though a pen is relevant to the doctor’s 
practice, expensive pens like Watermans® were seen as gifts.   
• 11% of the respondents felt that activities like dinners, sponsorship to 
congresses, expensive practice equipment including laptops would be 
gifts as these are intended to ‘bribe’ the doctor.   
• 20% of the respondents felt that anything from the industry, from a pen or 
lunch to congress sponsorship or equipment donation were gifts.  
 
As to how the sample doctors would react if the pharmaceuticals stopped 
extending perquisites to them, 90% said they would still be willing to see 
pharmaceutical representatives if the industry stopped giving branding items and 
86%  even if sponsoring of doctors to congresses ceased. 
 
4.2(e)  Respondents’ opinion on appropriate compensation for presentations on 
behalf of industry 
 
The study also attempted to gain insight into the remuneration dynamics around 
the relationship between respondent doctors and the pharmaceutical industry, 
specifically in respect of making medical presentations.  The areas probed 
include presentations at Continuing Medical Education (‘CMEs’) - including 
medical congresses- and presentations to medical funders on behalf of 
pharmaceutical companies.  The results revealed that 85% of the respondents 
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felt that doctors should be paid for speaking at CMEs, and just over half the 
sample (52%) felt they wanted to be paid their own rate, while 48% were happy 
with being paid the industry rate.  Suggested payments were mostly in the range 
R1, 000 to R5, 000 per presentation.  It is interesting to note that the 
remuneration band was suggested by the sample in response to open ended, 
unstructured questions where no grading was suggested by the researcher.  
Around 40% of the sample felt this band appropriate - with 41% of the 
respondents indicating this range acceptable for presenting at CMEs, 40% 
suggesting acceptability  for presentations to medical aids and 39% indicating it 
acceptable for presenting at medical congresses.  Only 7% of the respondent felt 
doctors should be paid more for presenting at medical congresses, suggesting a 
remuneration band of between R7, 501 and R10, 000. 
 50
4.2(f)  Respondents’ opinion on whether interaction with industry influences the 
doctors’ prescribing habits (see Figure 5) 
 
The study next turned to the investigation of the possible influence of the doctor’s 
relationship with the pharmaceutical industry on his/her choice of pharmaceutical 
therapeutic interventions; and the effect of this relationship on the ultimate 
standard and quality of care delivered by the doctor to his/her patient. 
The investigation revealed that 77% of the respondents felt that their interaction 
with the industry influenced their prescribing habits and suggesting that such 
influence to be more pervasive with their colleagues, specifically 95% felt their 
colleagues are influenced by their interaction with industry (p< 0.001) see Figure 
5 below.   
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Figure 5.  Percentage of respondents that feel interaction with industry influences 
prescribing habits: Self vs. Colleagues 





















About three quarters of the respondents (73%) believed patient management 
may be compromised if doctors’ prescribing habits are influenced by their 
interaction with the industry.  GPs (75%) felt more strongly about the possible 
harm to patient compared to specialists (68%) if doctors’ prescribing habits are 
influenced by their interaction with industry p<0.05. 
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4.2(g)  Respondents’ opinion on appropriate ‘gifts’ from the pharmaceutical 
industry 
 
Having focused on possibly perverse perquisites extended by the industry to the 
doctor, the questionnaire probed respondents for what they considered 
appropriate gifts from the industry; and then finally investigated the respondents’ 
awareness of the regulatory framework governing the interaction between doctor 
and industry.  
Respondents were given an opportunity to list up to ten (10) gifts. No list was 
provided by the researcher from which the respondents could choose. 
Respondents felt the following items were ethically acceptable gifts to doctors 
from the pharmaceutical companies: 
• 67% suggested branding items were acceptable 
• 20% thought textbooks, educational materials for patients and medical 
journals were appropriate 
• 16% felt sponsorship to congresses and CME activity should continue 
•  27% would like personal items like vouchers, wine, lunch and branded T-
shirts 
•  3% did not want any give-aways at all 
• 5% still wanted drug samples despite the legislation 
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4.2(h)  Awareness of regulations or guidelines on acceptance of gifts from 
industry (see Figure 6) 
 
Most respondents (72.5%) were either not aware or did not know of any 
regulations or guidelines with regards to acceptance of gifts by doctors from the 
industry.   
Of the 27.5% that either knew or were aware of the guidelines; only 28% were 
specifically aware of the local HPCSA guidelines, a mere 7% knew of Act 90 
(Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act 90 of 1997, 
hereafter referred to as Act 90), and only 6%  mentioned international codes like 
UK GMC, PhRMA, RCP, AMA guidelines. 
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Figure 6.  Awareness of regulation or guidelines among 27.5% of the sample that 
claimed awareness of guidelines regarding gifts from industry. 
 
Awareness of regulation or guidelines among 27.5% of the 














Notably, only 4% of all respondents in this sub-set of 27.5% were aware of the 
South African Marketing Code. 
More than half of these respondents (55%), although claiming familiarity with 
regulations and guidelines, could not explicitly name any guideline.  It is 
interesting to note however, that all respondents that were familiar with 
regulations and guidelines (whether or not they could name them), were also 
aware of the different types of unprofessional or unethical behaviour that the 
guidelines intend to contain.  For instance, these respondents indicated that drug 
samples were illegal, no perverse incentives were allowed, give-aways should be 
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of minimal value and relevant to the practice and no entertainment of partners at 
scientific meetings should be allowed.   
 
 56
5.0  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
5.1  Introduction 
 
The main objective of the study was to establish doctors’ opinions on gifts and 
incentives offered by the pharmaceutical industry.  The secondary objectives 
were to establish if these incentives or interaction with the industry influenced 
their prescribing habits; establish doctors’ opinion of the influence their 
interaction with the pharmaceutical industry had upon their prescribing habits and 
establish doctors’ awareness of the regulatory regime governing their acceptance 
of gifts from the industry. 
 
5.2  Discussion of Study Findings 
The findings of the study are highlighted in the discussion that follows.  The 
findings are presented to mirror the priority and sequence of the research 
questions as outlined above. 
 
• The study indicates that doctors generally accept incentives from the 
industry, and they to some extent feel justified in so doing as they 
feel that the industry should give them some ‘payment in kind’ for 
the opportunity cost of seeing reps.  
 
The perceived appropriateness of this acceptance of gifts and incentives did, 
however, appear to exist within certain bounds which are influenced by the dollar 
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value of the incentive.  This was evidenced by the fact that 75% of respondents 
felt it was inappropriate to accept a gift of R1, 000, while 92% of the respondents 
felt that it was appropriate to accept branding items.  60% of respondents felt it 
was appropriate to accept personal gifts from industry which in the main are not 
related to medical practice.  However, regardless of the value of the branding 
items or any other gifts received from industry, these can still be perceived as 
inducements even when the doctor believes otherwise, as shown by Gibbons, et 
al. (1998: 153) that patients felt gifts were less appropriate than did their doctors. 
 
The results further show, and with statistical significance, that doctors were of the 
opinion that their counterparts were more likely to accept gifts and other 
‘incentives’ from industry than they themselves.  This suggests that individual 
doctors hold themselves in higher moral and ethical esteem as compared to their 
colleagues.  
 
Despite doctors’ general acceptance of gifts as highlighted above, it is interesting 
to note that the majority of the respondents indicated they would be willing to see 
representatives in the absence of gifts and incentives. This may indicate that 
beside the perverse aspect of the interaction, doctors still perceived some value 
add from the industry in their interaction with pharmaceutical representatives. 
 
• Majority of the respondents felt that interaction with industry 
influenced their prescribing habits 
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The results indicate, with statistical significance, that doctors believed their 
colleagues (their prescribing habits that is) were more likely to be influenced than 
themselves; again expressing a less favourable opinion of their counterparts’ 
ethical and professional standards.  
 
Further, the majority of the respondents felt that patient management may be 
compromised if doctors’ prescribing habits are influenced by their interaction with 
industry.  More GP’s (75%) than specialists (68%) felt patient management may 
be compromised if interaction with industry exerted perverse influence on their 
prescribing habits.  Statistical testing revealed this difference in number between 
GPs and specialists to be statistically significant. 
 
• Majority of the respondents felt that doctors should be paid for 
speaking engagements on behalf of industry; and the suggested 
payment per engagement was mostly in the band between R1, 000 
and R5, 000. 
 
A minority (7%) felt that doctors should be paid more for presenting at 
congresses and the suggested compensation band was R7, 500 to R10, 000 per 
speaking engagement which typically lasts between half an hour to two hours at 
the very most.  It is interesting to compare this “asks” with the current reported 
R50/hour compensation for public sector doctors; especially in light of the current 
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more than one month old strike of public sector doctors at public hospitals in the 
various provinces.   
 
Although no industry compensation rate was defined in the study, nor declared 
by the respondents, the sample was split in the middle with half proclaiming to be 
satisfied with the going industry rate and the other half indicating they would 
prefer to “name their price”. 
 
• Only 28% of the respondents were aware of “any guidelines or 
regulations” governing acceptance of gifts by doctors, with again 
just 28% of this cohort mentioning the HPCSA guidelines 
 
The majority of respondents appeared not to be aware of what the industry is 
trying to achieve with the Marketing Code, as shown by a lack of awareness of 




5.3  Areas of future research 
The insights gained from the study have served as a platform from which we 
make recommendations for areas of possible future research.  The researcher 
has distilled three areas that are considered worthy of future research attention 
• Whereas this study focussed on the opinions of doctors in respect of the 
ethics around their acceptance of perverse incentives and gifts from the 
pharmaceutical industry, it would be of interest to establish from industry if 
doctors are indeed asking for incentives and gifts.  The objective being to 
illicit the extent to which industry believes doctors’ behaviour is 
instrumental in encouraging them (industry) to behave unethically by 
extending perverse incentives and gifts.  Fundamentally, the question 
would be: ‘to what extent do doctors consciously and actively requests 
gifts and incentives from industry, hence actually perpetuate the perverse 
relationship?’ 
• The research indicates that doctors’ inclination to accept gifts, and their 
perceived appropriateness of such acceptance, bears a somewhat inverse 
relationship to the monetary value of the gift or incentive.  A future 
research question is to explore if a dollar threshold that serves as an 
ethical boundary and informs the doctor when a gift is appropriate and 
when it is not exists.  The natural evolution of this line of inquiry would be 
to further investigate the predictive variables of such a threshold (if indeed 
it exists). 
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• Doctors have a responsibility towards their patients.  It would be 
interesting to explore what doctors believe to be their ethical and legal 
responsibilities when perverse incentives and gifts are offered to them. 
 
5.4  Recommendations 
 
Personal responsibility for ethical behaviour by the medical practitioner is 
fundamentally the responsibility of the doctor and one that cannot, and should 
not, be delegated to third parties.  The two most important organs that practically 
have sufficient leverage to curb unethical behaviour and perverse relationships 
are the HPCSA and the Pharmaceutical Industry’s Associations e. g. Innovative 
Medicines South Africa (IMSA) and Pharmaceutical Industry Association of South 
Africa (PIASA) to name a few. 
 
• The HPCSA has made a resolve to root out perversity in the healthcare 
profession as shown in recent cases where doctors were heavily 
sanctioned for their involvement in such activities.  Recommendations are 
for the HPCSA to engage in a nationwide comprehensive, and structured, 
education campaign on its guidelines to inform doctors of their guidelines. 
Specifically, doctors should be educated not only on the need and 
rationale for the guidelines aimed at curbing perverse relationships, but 
also of the penalty and sanction for breaching of the guidelines. The 
education campaign evidently will need to be ongoing if it is to shape and 
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change attitudes and behaviour that is chronic among adult individuals. 
Also a preventative approach would be for the HPCSA to engage with 
medical schools to ensure that these guidelines are an inherent part of 
ethics education especially at undergraduate level where interaction with 
the pharmaceutical marketing machinery is minimal and attitudes (and 
behaviour) are still malleable. 
• The pharmaceutical industry, through IMSA, PIASA and other industry 
associations, should also engage in an education campaign to educate 
doctors about the “Code” that govern their behaviour so doctors can be 
made aware of the type of ethical conduct expected of the industry.  It is 
possible that it would be easier for doctors to identify, and hopefully desist 
from being party to, perverse and unethical behaviour initiated by the 
industry if they had clarity of mind about what constitute industry perverse 
behaviour; and that it is their duty and responsibility to report such 
behaviour to the both the HPCSA and the MCA.  It is interesting that in 
South Africa, to date, no case has ever been taken up to the HPCSA that 
implicates the industry. 
• Improvements to the Marketing Code itself are recommended.  
Specifically, the local Marketing code needs to encourage transparency 
on gifts given and payments made to doctors, and other healthcare 
professionals, via the implementation of an open register which can be 
randomly audited.  This transparency, it is posited, will minimise requests 
for inflated payments and inappropriate inducements and perquisites. 
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5.5  Conclusion 
 
The pharmaceutical industry and the healthcare profession need to converge at 
some point, and their respective strategic imperatives of maximization of return 
on investments (industry) and optimisation of the quality and standard of health-
care (doctor) need to find confluence. 
From a marketing point of view, all available strategies to gain market share must 
be employed by the organisation; but to the extent that the pursuit for profit could 
lead to the death of patients there need to be boundaries and guidelines.  In 
addition, while the doctor may seek to enjoy certain perquisites offered by the 
industry, it is important to bear in mind that this could cloud clinical judgement to 
the patient’s detriment.  Furthermore, this is the moment when the principle of 
non-maleficence would be eroded. Hence, ethical boundaries need to be drawn. 
 
This study demonstrated that perverse incentives continue to be given to doctors, 
and doctors have not shown a distinct aversion to accepting these perverse 
incentives and gifts.  These perverse interactions have been shown in existing 
literature and in this research report to influence prescribing habits.  The trust 
that society places on the medical profession is eroded by such behaviour, 
especially when self interest supersedes patient interest.  
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Doctors do not seem to operate within their guidelines and legal framework, as 
stipulated by the HPCSA, when accepting these potentially harmful perquisites.  
What legal and ethical considerations are the doctors employing when accepting 
‘incentives’ from industry is the question; and what is the doctor’s role in 
protecting his/her patients?   
Ignorance of the guidelines, as the study indicates to be the case, does not justify 
involvement in perverse relationships.  Doctors have professional and personal 
moral responsibilities to ensure they familiarise themselves with guidelines 
regulating their professional conduct as put out by the professional bodies and 
councils in the country.  Moreover, the HPCSA is a statutory council as per the 
Health Professions Act No. 56 of 1974 and therefore, any policy and guideline 
documents emanating from this body would have quasilegal standing.  It is 
imperative that doctors understand this. 
 
Will it be business as usual for the industry, or will they conduct business in a 
more responsible way according to the letter and spirit of their own Code?  The 
Code and the HPCSA guidelines will not by themselves eradicate the problem of 
perverse relationships between the industry and the doctor.  The time has come 
for doctors to start taking personal responsibility for their actions and for the 















1 Gender  Male  Female  
2 Sector   Public sector practice  Private sector practice  
3 Specialty   GP  Specialist  
4 Age   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
5 Region   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
 
6 How often do you see pharmaceutical sales representatives?  
  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
 
7 Do you accept branding items from pharmaceutical sales representatives?  
 Always Often Sometimes Never
 
8 Do you think your colleagues accept branding items from pharmaceutical sales representatives?  
 Always Often Sometimes Never
 
9 Do you accept invitations to relationship building dinners with pharmaceutical companies?  
 Always Often Sometimes Never
 
10 Do you think your colleagues accept invitations to relationship building dinners with pharmaceutical companies?  
 Always Often Sometimes Never
 
11 Do you accept regular sponsorship to congresses from the same pharmaceutical company? 
 Always Often Sometimes Never
 
12 Do you think your colleagues accept regular sponsorships to congresses from the same pharmaceutical companies? 
 Always Often Sometimes Never
 
13 Do you think interaction with a pharmaceutical sales representatives influences your prescribing habits? 
 Always Often Sometimes Never
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14 Do you think other practitioners' prescribing habits are influenced by their interaction with pharmaceutical sales representatives? 
 Always Often Sometimes Never
 
15 Do you feel patient management may be compromised, if doctors' prescribing habits are influenced by the pharmaceutical industry
 Always Often Sometimes Never
 
16 What is your interpretation of a 'gift' from a pharmaceutical company? 
 
 
17 Do you accept personal gifts from pharmaceutical sales representatives? 
 Always Often Sometimes Never
 
18 Do you feel a personal gift from a pharmaceutical sales representative, say to the value of R1000.00, is appropriate? 
 Very appropriate Somewhat appropriate Somewhat inappropriate Very inappropriate
 
19 I would still be willing to see pharmaceutical sales representatives, if the industry stopped giving branding items. 
 Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree
 
20 I would still be willing to see pharmaceutical sales representatives, if the industry stopped sponsoring individuals to congresses. 
 Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree
 
21 Do you feel doctors should be paid for speaking at CMEs? 
 Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree
 
22 How much do you feel doctors should be paid for presenting, the same presentation, at CMEs (exclude initial preparation time)? 
  R .00
 
23 How much do you feel doctors should be paid for presenting, the same presentation, on behalf of pharmaceutical companies to me
(exclude initial preparation time)? 
  R .00
 
24 How much do you feel doctors should be paid for presenting at congresses including preparing the presentation? 
  R .00
 
25 Do you feel it is ethical for doctors to accept branding items from the pharmaceutical industry? 
 Very proper Proper Improper Very improper
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 26 Do you feel it is ethical for doctors to accept tickets sponsored by a pharmaceutical company to a sporting event? 
 Very proper Proper Improper Very improper
 
27 Do you feel it is ethical for doctors to accept a spa voucher sponsored by a pharmaceutical company whilst attending a congress?
 Very proper Proper Improper Very improper
 
28 Do you feel it is ethical for doctors to accept a free weekend away with a spouse or partner for being the highest prescriber of a pro
 Very proper Proper Improper Very improper
 
29 Do you think doctors should be paid their own rates or industry rate for speaking on behalf of pharmaceutical companies at CMEs?
 Own rate Industry rate
 
30 In your opinion, please list what you feel are ethically acceptable gifts that doctors may receive from the pharmaceutical companies
 
i.   ii.   iii.   iv.   v.
vi.   vii.   viii.   ix.   x.
 
31 Are you aware of any guidelines regarding acceptance of gifts, by doctors, from the pharmaceutical industry? 
 Yes No








                Thank you for taking the time to fill in this questionnaire.
 




















     
 
 
BEFORE YOU START:  
Before agreeing to participate, it is important that 
you read and understand the following explanation 
of the purpose of the study, the study procedures, 
benefits, risks, discomforts, and precautions as well 
as the alternative procedures that are available to 
you, and your right to withdraw from the study at any 
time.This information leaflet is to help you to decide 
if you would like to participate. You should fully 
understand what is involved before you agree to 
take part in this study. 
CONTACT: 
If you have any questions, do not hesitate to contact 
me via email at drmands@vodamail.co.za or  
call me on 082 852 4797 
AGREEMENT: 
You should not agree to take part unless you are 
satisfied about all the procedures involved.  
COMPLIANCE: 
Please be completely truthful with me regarding the 
information requested in the questionnaire. 
CONSENT: 
Completion of the survey will be regarded as 
consent to participate in the survey. 
PURPOSE OF THE SURVEY: 
The purpose of this study is to establish doctors' 
opinion on gifts and incentives offered by the 
pharmaceutical industry 
LENGTH OF THE SURVEY AND NUMBER OF 
PARTICIPANTS 
The survey will be conducted across the country and 
will be sent to approximately 500 GPs and 
Specialists in private practice. 
 
The survey will take approximately 25 minutes to 
complete 
RISKS AND BENEFITS OF PARTICIPATING IN 
THE SURVEY: 
There are no risks or benefits to you, Information will 
be stored by a third party and given to me as coded
data and therefore there is no risk of linking
participants to their responses. 
RIGHTS AS A PARTICIPANT IN THIS SURVEY: 
Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary 
and you can decline to participate, or stop at any 
time, without stating any reason.  
REIMBURSEMENT FOR PARTICIPATION: 
You will not be paid to participate in this survey.  
ETHICS APPROVAL: 
This research protocol has been submitted to the 
University of the Witwatersrand, Human Research 
Ethics Committee (HREC) and written approval has 
been granted by that committee. If you want any 
information regarding your rights as a research 
participant, or complaints regarding this research 
study, you may contact Prof. Cleaton-Jones, 
Chairperson of the University of the Witwatersrand, 
Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC), which 
is an independent committee established to help 
protect the rights of research participants at (011) 
717 2301. 
CONFIDENTIALITY: 
This questionnaire is being emailed by a third party
that has a database of GPs and Specialists in
private practice with email addresses. Responses
will be converted to coded data by the third party. 
Once a participant has responded or refused to 
participate in the survey, they will be taken off the 
sample list. I will be completely blinded to the names 
of participants on the survey. All information 
obtained during the course of this survey will be kept 
strictly confidential. Data that may be reported in 
scientific journals will not include any information 
that identifies you as a participant in this survey. 
DEFINITIONS: 
Branding Items – items of minimal value 
pens, torches that are branded with co
product logo 
 
Personal gifts – Items of higher value
normally not branded with product or com
e.g. shopping vouchers, gift hampers 
 
Industry rate for CMEs – Remuneration f
an average fee paid by most pharm
companies for CMEs  
      















                                                     Cumulative    Cumulative 
                     nq1    Frequency     Percent     Frequency      Percent 
                     ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                     F           103       25.75           103        25.75 
                     M           297       74.25           400       100.00 
 
 
                                                       Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   nq2        Frequency     Percent     Frequency      Percent 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                   Private         400      100.00           400       100.00 
 
 
                                                        Cumulative    Cumulative 
                 nq3           Frequency     Percent     Frequency      Percent 
                 ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                 GP                 206       51.50           206        51.50 
                 Specialist         194       48.50           400       100.00 
 
 
                                                       Cumulative    Cumulative 
                  nq4         Frequency     Percent     Frequency      Percent 
                  ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                  31-40yrs         125       31.25           125        31.25 
                  41-50yrs         136       34.00           261        65.25 
                  51-60yrs          94       23.50           355        88.75 
                  <30 yrs           11        2.75           366        91.50 
                  >61yrs            34        8.50           400       100.00 
 
 
                                                          Cumulative    Cumulative 
                nq5              Frequency     Percent     Frequency      Percent 
                ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                Eastern Cape           26        6.50            26         6.50 
                Free State             17        4.25            43        10.75 
                Gauteng               179       44.75           222        55.50 
                KwaZulu Natal          56       14.00           278        69.50 
                Limpopo                11        2.75           289        72.25 
                Mpumalanga              9        2.25           298        74.50 
                North West             13        3.25           311        77.75 
                Northern Cape           4        1.00           315        78.75 
                Western Cape           85       21.25           400       100.00 
 
                                         
 
                                                          Cumulative    Cumulative 
               nq6               Frequency     Percent     Frequency      Percent 
               ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
               < once a year           11        2.75            11         2.75 
               > once a week          168       42.00           179        44.75 
               every 2 months          15        3.75           194        48.50 
               every 3 months           4        1.00           198        49.50 
               every 4 months           5        1.25           203        50.75 
               once a month            45       11.25           248        62.00 
               once a week             89       22.25           337        84.25 
               once a year              7        1.75           344        86.00 
               twice a month           47       11.75           391        97.75 
               twice a year             9        2.25           400       100.00 
 
 
                                                        Cumulative    Cumulative 
                  nq7          Frequency     Percent     Frequency      Percent 
                  ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                  Always            139       34.75           139        34.75 
                  Never              33        8.25           172        43.00 
                  Often             133       33.25           305        76.25 
                  Sometimes          95       23.75           400       100.00 
 
 
                                                        Cumulative    Cumulative 
                  nq8          Frequency     Percent     Frequency      Percent 
                  ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                  Always            157       39.25           157        39.25 
                  Never               5        1.25           162        40.50 
                  Often             174       43.50           336        84.00 
                  Sometimes          64       16.00           400       100.00 
 
 
                                                        Cumulative    Cumulative 
                  nq9          Frequency     Percent     Frequency      Percent 
                  ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                  Always             19        4.75            19         4.75 
                  Never             104       26.00           123        30.75 
                  Often              97       24.25           220        55.00 
                  Sometimes         180       45.00           400       100.00 
 
 
                                         
 
 
                                                       Cumulative    Cumulative 
                  nq10        Frequency     Percent     Frequency      Percent 
                  ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                  Always            21        5.25            21         5.25 
                  Never             13        3.25            34         8.50 
                  Often            208       52.00           242        60.50 
                  Sometime         158       39.50           400       100.00 
 
 
                                                       Cumulative    Cumulative 
                  nq11        Frequency     Percent     Frequency      Percent 
                  ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                  Always            11        2.75            11         2.75 
                  Never            219       54.75           230        57.50 
                  Often             41       10.25           271        67.75 
                  Sometime         129       32.25           400       100.00 
 
 
                                                       Cumulative    Cumulative 
                  nq12        Frequency     Percent     Frequency      Percent 
                  ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                  Always            25        6.25            25         6.25 
                  Never             26        6.50            51        12.75 
                  Often            166       41.50           217        54.25 
                  Sometime         183       45.75           400       100.00 
 
 
                                                       Cumulative    Cumulative 
                  nq13        Frequency     Percent     Frequency      Percent 
                  ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                  Always             7        1.75             7         1.75 
                  Never             93       23.25           100        25.00 
                  Often             90       22.50           190        47.50 
                  Sometime         210       52.50           400       100.00 
 
 
                                                       Cumulative    Cumulative 
                  nq14        Frequency     Percent     Frequency      Percent 
                  ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                  Always            11        2.75            11         2.75 
                  Never             20        5.00            31         7.75 
                  Often            142       35.50           173        43.25 
                  Sometime         227       56.75           400       100.00 
 
 
                                         
                                                       Cumulative    Cumulative 
                  nq15        Frequency     Percent     Frequency      Percent 
                  ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                  Always            21        5.25            21         5.25 
                  Never            109       27.25           130        32.50 
                  Often             72       18.00           202        50.50 
                  Sometime         198       49.50           400       100.00 
 
 
                                                 
                                                     Cumulative    Cumulative 
                     Q16    Frequency     Percent     Frequency      Percent 
                     ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                       1         101       25.25           101        25.25 
                       2          98       24.50           199        49.75 
                       3          66       16.50           265        66.25 
                       4          43       10.75           308        77.00 
                       5          79       19.75           387        96.75 
                       6          13        3.25           400       100.00 
 
 
                                                       Cumulative    Cumulative 
                  nq17        Frequency     Percent     Frequency      Percent 
                  ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                  Always            49       12.25            49        12.25 
                  Never            136       34.00           185        46.25 
                  Often             46       11.50           231        57.75 
                  Sometime         169       42.25           400       100.00 
 
 
                                                              Cumulative    Cumulative 
           nq18                      Frequency     Percent     Frequency      Percent 
           ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
           Somewhat appropriate            64       16.00            64        16.00 
           Somewhat inappropriate          76       19.00           140        35.00 
           Very appropriate                36        9.00           176        44.00 
           Very inappropriate             224       56.00           400       100.00 
 
 
                                        The FREQ Procedure 
 
                                                            Cumulative    Cumulative 
              nq19                 Frequency     Percent     Frequency      Percent 
              ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
              Agree                     165       41.25           165        41.25 
              Disagree                   30        7.50           195        48.75 
              Strongly agree            195       48.75           390        97.50 
              Strongly disagree          10        2.50           400       100.00 
 
 
                                                            Cumulative    Cumulative 
              nq20                 Frequency     Percent     Frequency      Percent 
              ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
              Agree                     159       39.75           159        39.75 
              Disagree                   42       10.50           201        50.25 
              Strongly agree            184       46.00           385        96.25 
              Strongly disagree          15        3.75           400       100.00 
 
 
                                                            Cumulative    Cumulative 
              nq21                 Frequency     Percent     Frequency      Percent 
              ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
              Agree                     147       36.75           147        36.75 
              Disagree                   33        8.25           180        45.00 
              Strongly agree            192       48.00           372        93.00 
              Strongly disagree          28        7.00           400       100.00 
 
 
                                                                                      Q22 
 
                                                          Cumulative    Cumulative 
                nq25             Frequency     Percent     Frequency      Percent 
                ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                Improper               41       10.25            41        10.25 
                Proper                259       64.75           300        75.00 
                Very improper          19        4.75           319        79.75 
                Very proper            81       20.25           400       100.00 
 
 
                                                          Cumulative    Cumulative 
                nq26             Frequency     Percent     Frequency      Percent 
                ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                Improper              106       26.50           106        26.50 
                Proper                180       45.00           286        71.50 
                Very improper          53       13.25           339        84.75 
                Very proper            61       15.25           400       100.00 
 
 
                                                          Cumulative    Cumulative 
                nq27             Frequency     Percent     Frequency      Percent 
                ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                Improper              114       28.50           114        28.50 
                Proper                168       42.00           282        70.50 
                Very improper          57       14.25           339        84.75 
                Very proper            61       15.25           400       100.00 
 
 
                                                          Cumulative    Cumulative 
                nq28             Frequency     Percent     Frequency      Percent 
                ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                Improper               99       24.75            99        24.75 
                Proper                 40       10.00           139        34.75 
                Very improper         238       59.50           377        94.25 
                Very proper            23        5.75           400       100.00 
 
 
                                                          Cumulative    Cumulative 
                nq29             Frequency     Percent     Frequency      Percent 
                ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                Industry rate         192       48.00           192        48.00 
                Own rate              208       52.00           400       100.00 
 
 
                                         
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                    Q30_1    Frequency     Percent     Frequency      Percent 
                    ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        0          76       19.00            76        19.00 
                        1         267       66.75           343        85.75 
                        2          21        5.25           364        91.00 
                        3          13        3.25           377        94.25 
                        4           9        2.25           386        96.50 
                        5          12        3.00           398        99.50 
                        6           2        0.50           400       100.00 
 
                                                
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                    Q30_2    Frequency     Percent     Frequency      Percent 
                    ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        2          59       33.33            59        33.33 
                        3          37       20.90            96        54.24 
                        4          73       41.24           169        95.48 
                        6           8        4.52           177       100.00 
 
                                     Frequency Missing = 223 
 
                                               
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                    Q30_3    Frequency     Percent     Frequency      Percent 
                    ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                    3              13       26.53            13        26.53 
                    4              27       55.10            40        81.63 
                    6               9       18.37            49       100.00 
 
                                     Frequency Missing = 351 
 
                                         
                                                     Cumulative    Cumulative 
                    nq31    Frequency     Percent     Frequency      Percent 
                    ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                    N            290       72.50           290        72.50 
                    Y            110       27.50           400       100.00 
 
                                                
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                    Q32_1    Frequency     Percent     Frequency      Percent 
                    ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        1          30       28.04            30        28.04 
                        2           7        6.54            37        34.58 
                        3           4        3.74            41        38.32 
                        4          63       58.88           104        97.20 
                        5           3        2.80           107       100.00 
 
                                     Frequency Missing = 293 
 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                    Q32_2    Frequency     Percent     Frequency      Percent 
                    ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        2           3       27.27             3        27.27 
                        3           5       45.45             8        72.73 
                        4           1        9.09             9        81.82 
                        5           2       18.18            11       100.00 
 
                                     Frequency Missing = 389 
 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                    Q32_3    Frequency     Percent     Frequency      Percent 
                    ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
 






Once a week - > once a week 257 (64.3) 
Once a month – twice a month 92 (23.0) 
Every 2 – 4 months 24 (6.0) 
Once a year – twice a year 16 (4.0) 
< once a year 11 (2.7) 








                                         
                                                        Cumulative    Cumulative 
                 nq22          Frequency     Percent     Frequency      Percent 
                 ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                         0           58       14.61            58        14.61 
                      10000          24        6.05            82        20.65 
                    1-1000          145       36.52           227        57.18 
                 1001-2500          106       26.70           333        83.88 
                 2501-5000           57       14.36           390        98.24 
                 5001-7500            2        0.50           392        98.74 
                 7501-10000           5        1.26           397       100.00 
 
                                      Frequency Missing = 3 
 
 
                                                        Cumulative    Cumulative 
                 nq23          Frequency     Percent     Frequency      Percent 
                 ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                         0           68       17.22            68        17.22 
                      10000          25        6.33            93        23.54 
                    1-1000          134       33.92           227        57.47 
                 1001-2500           82       20.76           309        78.23 
                 2501-5000           75       18.99           384        97.22 
                 5001-7500            2        0.51           386        97.72 
                 7501-10000           9        2.28           395       100.00 
 
                                      Frequency Missing = 5 
 
 
                                                        Cumulative    Cumulative 
                 nq24          Frequency     Percent     Frequency      Percent 
                 ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                         0          119       30.05           119        30.05 
                      10000          24        6.06           143        36.11 
                    1-1000           62       15.66           205        51.77 
                 1001-2500           59       14.90           264        66.67 
                 2501-5000           96       24.24           360        90.91 
                 5001-7500            7        1.77           367        92.68 
                 7501-10000          29        7.32           396       100.00 
 
                                      Frequency Missing = 4 
CROSS TABULATION DEMOGRAPHICS AND ITEMS 
 
                                        The SAS System          08:22 Saturday, May 9, 
2009  13 
 
                                      The FREQ Procedure 
 
                                     Table of Q3 by nnq11 
 
                             Q3(Q3)      nnq11 
 
                             Frequency  ‚ 
                             Row Pct    ‚ 
                             Col Pct    ‚No      ‚Yes     ‚  Total 
                             ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆ 
                             GP         ‚    137 ‚     69 ‚    206 
                                        ‚  66.50 ‚  33.50 ‚ 
                                        ‚  62.56 ‚  38.12 ‚ 
                             ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆ 
                             Specialist ‚     82 ‚    112 ‚    194 
                                        ‚  42.27 ‚  57.73 ‚ 
                                        ‚  37.44 ‚  61.88 ‚ 
                             ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆ 
                             Total           219      181      400 
 
 
                              Statistics for Table of Q3 by nnq11 
 
                    Statistic                     DF       Value      Prob 
                    ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                    Chi-Square                     1     23.6896    <.0001 
                    Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square    1     23.9155    <.0001 
                    Continuity Adj. Chi-Square     1     22.7214    <.0001 
                    Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square     1     23.6304    <.0001 
                    Phi Coefficient                       0.2434 
                    Contingency Coefficient               0.2365 
                    Cramer's V                            0.2434 
 
 
                                     Fisher's Exact Test 
                              ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                              Cell (1,1) Frequency (F)       137 
                              Left-sided Pr <= F          1.0000 
                              Right-sided Pr >= F      8.447E-07 
 
                              Table Probability (P)    5.450E-07 
                              Two-sided Pr <= P        1.304E-06 
 




                                        The SAS System          08:22 Saturday, May 9, 
2009  11 
 
                                      The FREQ Procedure 
 
                                     Table of Q3 by nnq15 
 
                             Q3(Q3)      nnq15 
 
                             Frequency  ‚ 
                             Row Pct    ‚ 
                             Col Pct    ‚No      ‚Yes     ‚  Total 
                             ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆ 
                             GP         ‚     46 ‚    160 ‚    206 
                                        ‚  22.33 ‚  77.67 ‚ 
                                        ‚  42.20 ‚  54.98 ‚ 
                             ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆ 
                             Specialist ‚     63 ‚    131 ‚    194 
                                        ‚  32.47 ‚  67.53 ‚ 
                                        ‚  57.80 ‚  45.02 ‚ 
                             ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆ 
                             Total           109      291      400 
 
 
                              Statistics for Table of Q3 by nnq15 
 
                    Statistic                     DF       Value      Prob 
                    ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                    Chi-Square                     1      5.1861    0.0228 
                    Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square    1      5.1970    0.0226 
                    Continuity Adj. Chi-Square     1      4.6870    0.0304 
                    Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square     1      5.1731    0.0229 
                    Phi Coefficient                      -0.1139 
                    Contingency Coefficient               0.1131 
                    Cramer's V                           -0.1139 
 
 
                                     Fisher's Exact Test 
                              ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                              Cell (1,1) Frequency (F)        46 
                              Left-sided Pr <= F          0.0151 
                              Right-sided Pr >= F         0.9916 
 
                              Table Probability (P)       0.0068 
                              Two-sided Pr <= P           0.0249 
 
                                       Sample Size = 400 
 
CROSS TABULATION BETWEEN QUESTIONS 
 
 
                                        The SAS System          08:22 Saturday, May 9, 
2009   7 
 
                                      The FREQ Procedure 
 
                                     Table of nnq7 by nnq8 
 
                              nnq7      nnq8 
 
                              Frequency‚ 
                              Row Pct  ‚ 
                              Col Pct  ‚No      ‚Yes     ‚  Total 
                              ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆ 
                              No       ‚      5 ‚     28 ‚     33 
                                       ‚  15.15 ‚  84.85 ‚ 
                                       ‚ 100.00 ‚   7.09 ‚ 
                              ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆ 
                              Yes      ‚      0 ‚    367 ‚    367 
                                       ‚   0.00 ‚ 100.00 ‚ 
                                       ‚   0.00 ‚  92.91 ‚ 
                              ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆ 
                              Total           5      395      400 
 
 
                             Statistics for Table of nnq7 by nnq8 
 
                    Statistic                     DF       Value      Prob 
                    ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                    Chi-Square                     1     56.3099    <.0001 
                    Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square    1     25.6858    <.0001 
                    Continuity Adj. Chi-Square     1     44.7042    <.0001 
                    Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square     1     56.1692    <.0001 
                    Phi Coefficient                       0.3752 
                    Contingency Coefficient               0.3513 
                    Cramer's V                            0.3752 
 
                     WARNING: 50% of the cells have expected counts less 
                              than 5. Chi-Square may not be a valid test. 
 
 
                                     Fisher's Exact Test 
                              ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                              Cell (1,1) Frequency (F)         5 
                              Left-sided Pr <= F          1.0000 
                              Right-sided Pr >= F      2.852E-06 
 
                              Table Probability (P)    2.852E-06 
                              Two-sided Pr <= P        2.852E-06 
 




                                        The SAS System          08:22 Saturday, May 9, 
2009   9 
 
                                      The FREQ Procedure 
 
                                    Table of nnq9 by nnq10 
 
                              nnq9      nnq10 
 
                              Frequency‚ 
                              Row Pct  ‚ 
                              Col Pct  ‚No      ‚Yes     ‚  Total 
                              ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆ 
                              No       ‚     13 ‚     91 ‚    104 
                                       ‚  12.50 ‚  87.50 ‚ 
                                       ‚ 100.00 ‚  23.51 ‚ 
                              ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆ 
                              Yes      ‚      0 ‚    296 ‚    296 
                                       ‚   0.00 ‚ 100.00 ‚ 
                                       ‚   0.00 ‚  76.49 ‚ 
                              ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆ 
                              Total          13      387      400 
 
 
                             Statistics for Table of nnq9 by nnq10 
 
                    Statistic                     DF       Value      Prob 
                    ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                    Chi-Square                     1     38.2429    <.0001 
                    Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square    1     36.2940    <.0001 
                    Continuity Adj. Chi-Square     1     34.3709    <.0001 
                    Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square     1     38.1473    <.0001 
                    Phi Coefficient                       0.3092 
                    Contingency Coefficient               0.2954 
                    Cramer's V                            0.3092 
 
                     WARNING: 25% of the cells have expected counts less 
                              than 5. Chi-Square may not be a valid test. 
 
 
                                     Fisher's Exact Test 
                              ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                              Cell (1,1) Frequency (F)        13 
                              Left-sided Pr <= F          1.0000 
                              Right-sided Pr >= F      1.382E-08 
 
                              Table Probability (P)    1.382E-08 
                              Two-sided Pr <= P        1.382E-08 
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                                      The FREQ Procedure 
 
                                    Table of nnq11 by nnq12 
 
                              nnq11     nnq12 
 
                              Frequency‚ 
                              Row Pct  ‚ 
                              Col Pct  ‚No      ‚Yes     ‚  Total 
                              ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆ 
                              No       ‚     26 ‚    193 ‚    219 
                                       ‚  11.87 ‚  88.13 ‚ 
                                       ‚ 100.00 ‚  51.60 ‚ 
                              ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆ 
                              Yes      ‚      0 ‚    181 ‚    181 
                                       ‚   0.00 ‚ 100.00 ‚ 
                                       ‚   0.00 ‚  48.40 ‚ 
                              ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆ 
                              Total          26      374      400 
 
 
                            Statistics for Table of nnq11 by nnq12 
 
                    Statistic                     DF       Value      Prob 
                    ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                    Chi-Square                     1     22.9824    <.0001 
                    Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square    1     32.8133    <.0001 
                    Continuity Adj. Chi-Square     1     21.0705    <.0001 
                    Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square     1     22.9250    <.0001 
                    Phi Coefficient                       0.2397 
                    Contingency Coefficient               0.2331 
                    Cramer's V                            0.2397 
 
 
                                     Fisher's Exact Test 
                              ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                              Cell (1,1) Frequency (F)        26 
                              Left-sided Pr <= F          1.0000 
                              Right-sided Pr >= F      7.718E-08 
 
                              Table Probability (P)    7.718E-08 
                              Two-sided Pr <= P        9.169E-08 
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                                      The FREQ Procedure 
 
                                    Table of nnq13 by nnq14 
 
                              nnq13     nnq14 
 
                              Frequency‚ 
                              Row Pct  ‚ 
                              Col Pct  ‚No      ‚Yes     ‚  Total 
                              ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆ 
                              No       ‚     19 ‚     74 ‚     93 
                                       ‚  20.43 ‚  79.57 ‚ 
                                       ‚  95.00 ‚  19.47 ‚ 
                              ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆ 
                              Yes      ‚      1 ‚    306 ‚    307 
                                       ‚   0.33 ‚  99.67 ‚ 
                                       ‚   5.00 ‚  80.53 ‚ 
                              ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆ 
                              Total          20      380      400 
 
 
                            Statistics for Table of nnq13 by nnq14 
 
                    Statistic                     DF       Value      Prob 
                    ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                    Chi-Square                     1     60.7364    <.0001 
                    Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square    1     51.1886    <.0001 
                    Continuity Adj. Chi-Square     1     56.5776    <.0001 
                    Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square     1     60.5845    <.0001 
                    Phi Coefficient                       0.3897 
                    Contingency Coefficient               0.3631 
                    Cramer's V                            0.3897 
 
                     WARNING: 25% of the cells have expected counts less 
                              than 5. Chi-Square may not be a valid test. 
 
 
                                     Fisher's Exact Test 
                              ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                              Cell (1,1) Frequency (F)        19 
                              Left-sided Pr <= F          1.0000 
                              Right-sided Pr >= F      3.203E-12 
 
                              Table Probability (P)    3.165E-12 
                              Two-sided Pr <= P        3.203E-12 
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                                      The FREQ Procedure 
 
                                    Table of nnq17 by nnq18 
 
                              nnq17     nnq18 
 
                              Frequency‚ 
                              Row Pct  ‚ 
                              Col Pct  ‚appropri‚inapprop‚  Total 
                                       ‚ate     ‚riate   ‚ 
                              ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆ 
                              No       ‚     10 ‚    126 ‚    136 
                                       ‚   7.35 ‚  92.65 ‚ 
                                       ‚  10.00 ‚  42.00 ‚ 
                              ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆ 
                              Yes      ‚     90 ‚    174 ‚    264 
                                       ‚  34.09 ‚  65.91 ‚ 
                                       ‚  90.00 ‚  58.00 ‚ 
                              ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆ 
                              Total         100      300      400 
 
 
                            Statistics for Table of nnq17 by nnq18 
 
                    Statistic                     DF       Value      Prob 
                    ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                    Chi-Square                     1     34.2246    <.0001 
                    Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square    1     39.6366    <.0001 
                    Continuity Adj. Chi-Square     1     32.8134    <.0001 
                    Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square     1     34.1390    <.0001 
                    Phi Coefficient                      -0.2925 
                    Contingency Coefficient               0.2807 
                    Cramer's V                           -0.2925 
 
 
                                     Fisher's Exact Test 
                              ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                              Cell (1,1) Frequency (F)        10 
                              Left-sided Pr <= F       4.237E-10 
                              Right-sided Pr >= F         1.0000 
 
                              Table Probability (P)    3.612E-10 
                              Two-sided Pr <= P        5.392E-10 
 







Abbreviations and Acronyms 
 
 
AAMC – Association of American Medical Colleges 
ABPI – Association of British Pharmaceutical Industry 
ACGME – Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education 
AMA – American Medical Association 
CME – Continuing Medical Education 
CPD – Continuing Professional Development 
DoH – Department of Health 
ERC – Ethics Review Committee 
GMC – General Medical Council 
HPCSA – Health Professions Council of South Africa 
IMSA – Innovative Medicines South Africa 
MCA – Marketing Code Authority 
PhRMA – Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America 
PIASA – Pharmaceutical Industry Association of South Africa 
RCP – Royal College of Physicians 
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